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ABSTRACT 
 
Several studies have characterized the relation between discretionary accruals and 
earnings before-taxes to test for the existence of earnings smoothing behaviors. In this 
paper, we argue that the characteristic response of accruals to earnings is not linear, as 
the literature has shown. Instead, it is likely to be driven by non-linear patterns since 
both the incentives to manipulate earnings and the practical way to do so depend, in 
part, on the relative size of earnings. Using a sample of 9,442 US banks in the period 
1999-2008, this paper shows that bank managers tend to use provisions as a smoothing 
devise when earnings are substantial (“cookie-jar” strategies), engage in earnings-
decreasing strategies when losses are relatively large (“big-bath” accounting) and, most 
of the time, use provisions as an earnings-increasing tool. Hence, it is shown that 
nonlinear specifications are more informative with regard to the different strategies 
employed to manipulate earnings. 
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Abstract 
Several studies have characterized the relation between discretionary accruals and 
earnings before-taxes to test for the existence of earnings smoothing behaviors. In this 
paper, we argue that the characteristic response of accruals to earnings is not linear, as 
the literature has shown. Instead, it is likely to be driven by non-linear patterns since 
both the incentives to manipulate earnings and the practical way to do so depend, in 
part, on the relative size of earnings. Using a sample of 9,442 US banks in the period 
1999-2008, this paper shows that bank managers tend to use provisions as a smoothing 
devise when earnings are substantial (“cookie-jar” strategies), engage in earnings-
decreasing strategies when losses are relatively large (“big-bath” accounting) and, most 
of the time, use provisions as an earnings-increasing tool. Hence, it is shown that non-
linear specifications are more informative with regard to the different strategies employed 
to manipulate earnings.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Among the different forms of managerial manipulation framed into the category 
of earnings management, income smoothing has attracted considerable attention from 
regulators and academics. The central hypothesis is that managers have incentives to 
artificially reduce the variability of reported earnings relative to economic earnings by 
using the flexibility provided by the accounting standards, increasing (reducing) 
discretionary accruals when the firm generates large (small) operating income. The 
incentives to carry out these practices are manifold and include the desire to influence 
the risk perception of market agents, to maintain artificially favorable dividend policies, 
and to attain personal objectives within the context of the agency and compensation 
theories; see Brady and Sinkey (1988) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) for a discussion.  
 
Several studies have analyzed the existence of these practices in the banking 
industry. In this sector, the loan loss provision (LLP henceforth) is widely considered as 
an optimal managerial tool for accounting manipulation, not only because it is the 
largest accrual in relation to size, but also because it offers a considerable degree of 
discretionary behavior; see Brady and Sinkey (1988). The basic prediction of the 
income-smoothing hypothesis is that LLP is positively related to before-provisions 
earnings, which gives rise to a simple testable hypothesis in the linear regression 
context. Most papers have addressed this issue through the use of pooled or panel-data 
regressions. However, the evidence so far is not completely conclusive in the banking 
industry. The main conclusions are sensitive to the choice of the sample and the specific 
econometric technique involved. For instance, Brady and Sinkey (1988), Ma (1988), 
Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen (1995), Bhat (1996), 
Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Matheu (2003), Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Laeven 
and Majnoni (2006), among others find evidence supporting this form of earnings 
management, while Scheiner (1981), Wetmore and Brick (1994), Beatty, Chamberlain 
and Magliolo (1995), Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999) and Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2008) do not.  
 
Why is the evidence of artificial income smoothing so elusive? The discretionary 
nature of loan-provisioning makes it virtually impossible to establish a structural theory 
that fully describes the dynamics of this variable. In the absence of this guidance, 
researchers must face a number of subjective judgments related to econometric 
considerations, such as which particular variables to use, how to relate them to LLP, and 
how to estimate parameters and conduct inference. This form of uncertainty has given 
rise to a considerable lack of methodological consensus in this field that may explain, at 
least partially, the origin of the heterogeneous evidence. The possibility of any form of 
model misspecification in the empirical modeling of LLP is a major concern (Lobo and 
Yang, 2001), but this issue has received little attention.  
 
In this paper, we argue that the relation between discretionary accruals and 
earnings may adopt a characteristically nonlinear form that depends on the size of 
economic income. This feature may have sheer consequences on the linear econometric 
analysis typically used to model accrual dynamics, for instance, to test the earnings-
smoothing hypothesis or characterizing pro-cyclical patterns (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner, 1994; Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005).  
More specifically, the conditional dynamics of discretionary accruals is likely to be 
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characterized by a nonlinear function on earnings because both the incentives to 
manipulate earnings and the practical way to do so depend, in part, on the relative size 
of this accounting variable. The standard linear regression analysis neglects the 
possibility of nonlinear responses of this kind, which may lead to biases in the main 
conclusions as a consequence of functional form misspecification. To exemplify this 
concern, assume that the estimated value of the slope coefficient in a linear regression 
of LLP on earnings is exactly zero. Then, it seems natural to conclude that bank 
executives do not use LLP to manage earnings. However, this conclusion may also be 
reached spuriously if bank executives do engage actively in earnings manipulation, yet 
apply different strategies depending on the size of earnings. For instance, if managers 
decrease LLP when earnings are negative, but increase them otherwise such that the 
global expectation is approximately zero, the estimates from the linear regression would 
wrongly suggest absence of earnings management due to model misspecification. It 
suffices to extend the linear model to accommodate asymmetric patterns around the 
zero-threshold to detect the true underlying behavior and draw sound conclusions. In 
practice, nonlinear responses may be characterized by multiple regimes determined by 
unknown thresholds and different marginal propensities. This paper discusses the 
convenience of a more general methodological approach to characterize the dynamics of 
accruals, namely, nonlinear threshold panel regressions (Hansen, 1999, 2000), and 
provides empirical evidence on its suitability in an analysis on the US banking sector. 
 
There are several reasons that may explain why this class of nonlinearities may 
underlie the dynamics of discretionary accruals. Among these, the compensation theory 
offers us a reasonable justification, since the incentives for bank managers to 
manipulate earnings stem, in part, from the existence of variable compensations. In 
practice, bonuses, stock options and other mechanisms of performance-based 
compensation provide bank managers with heterogeneous incentives to manage 
earnings because their performance is usually measured in terms of accounting profits; 
see, among others, Healey (1985). Since the expected present value of the total 
compensation depends on whether the realized value of the performance measure is 
below, within, or above certain thresholds (or target) levels embedded in these plans, 
executives have different incentives to increase or decrease earnings accordingly via 
discretionary accruals. As a result, the characteristic response that links accruals to the 
distribution of earnings is sensitive to thresholds-in-earnings, which may give rise to 
nonlinear patterns.1 Given that variable compensation is a widespread practice in the 
financial industry, common patterns in the individual behavior of managers could 
emerge and be detected in panel data through nonlinear regressions, remarkably, even in 
the absence of specific data on the individual compensation plans.  
 
Our study analyzes a panel formed by more than 9,400 banks operating in the 
US in the period 1999-2008. Using the standard cross-sectional and panel-data linear 
regression techniques, the preliminary evidence based on the standard regression 
analysis supports the income-smoothing hypothesis. However, in a robust analysis using 
different techniques to winsorize data, we observe that the statistical evidence is very 
sensitive to the tails of the distribution of earnings, particularly, to the set of largest 
                                                 
1 The compensation theory provides both theoretical and empirical arguments supporting the existence of 
nonlinear patterns stemming from different incentives. For instance, Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) 
provide theoretical arguments sustaining that different forms of earnings manipulation can exist 
simultaneously. Also, Laeven and Majnoni (2006) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) show asymmetric 
(i.e., non-linear) behaviors around the zero-earnings level. Section 2 surveys this literature. 
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positive earnings in the sample. This effect is not necessarily the consequence of 
outliers or measurement errors in the data, but also of neglected nonlinear patterns in the 
linear analysis. Using a piecewise linear specification defined on the empirical deciles 
of earnings, first, and then a more sophisticated nonlinear threshold regressions that 
allow endogenously for different regimes in earnings, we uncover a strong nonlinear 
relation between LLP and earnings. The overall picture that emerges suggests that, on 
average, bank managers tend to use the allowance as a smoothing devise when earnings 
are substantial (“cookie-jar” strategies), engage in earnings-decreasing strategies when 
losses are relatively large (“big-bath” accounting) and, most of the time, use LLP as an 
earnings-increasing instrument. The threshold analysis reveals three main regimes 
which are endogenously characterized in the period, respectively, by earnings (scaled by 
total assets) smaller than 1.81%, larger than 3.64%, and within these thresholds, 
determining whether big-bath, earnings-increasing or smoothing seems to be mainly 
applied. The hypothesis of overall smoothing management, therefore, is strongly 
rejected in favor of a more complex behavior which supports the coexistence of several 
forms of earnings management. 
 
This paper can be related to different strands of literature in applied financial 
accounting. It belongs to the vast body of research concerned with accrual modeling 
and, more specifically, with the studies that have characterized nonlinear dependences 
between accruals and other accounting variables. Basu (1997) reported different 
incremental slopes in cash flow and earnings when these are regressed on positive and 
negative stock returns, which shows implicit evidence of nonlinear patterns between 
accruals and cash flows. Indeed, Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that the relation 
between accruals and cash flows cannot be linear because of timely loss recognition, 
which challenges the linear specification commonly used in accrual models; see also, 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Moreira and Pope (2007), Anderson, Woodhouse, Ramsay 
and Faff (2009) and references therein for recent studies. Our paper contributes to this 
literature by showing strong evidence of nonlinear patterns between the main accrual in 
the banking industry and earnings. To the best of our knowledge, the general existence 
of such patterns has not been discussed before, although Laeven and Majnoni (2006), 
Bouvatier and Leepetit (2008) and Balboa, López-Espinosa and Rubia (2010) report 
evidence of asymmetric responses around zero earnings. Our paper can also be related 
to different studies concerned with the effects of econometric misspecification in the 
analysis on accrual-related models. Kraft, Leone and Wasley (2006 and 2007) discussed 
the effects of outliers and omitted variables, respectively, when testing for the accrual 
anomaly. Our study provides evidence that neglecting nonlinearities may lead towards 
spurious conclusions on the extent and the existence of smoothing practices; e.g., linear 
models cannot detect the simultaneous coexistence of big-bath and smoothing 
techniques. Finally, this paper is related to the vast literature on earnings management 
and income-smoothing in the banking industry. Our study provides clear evidence that 
US bank managers tend to engage actively in different strategies to manage earnings by 
using allowances discretionarily. 
 
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section two 
reviews the literature that supports the existence of nonlinear patterns in accruals as a 
function of the level of earnings. Section three introduces the dataset used in this paper 
and analyzes the income-smoothing hypothesis by means of both pooled cross-sectional 
and panel- linear regressions. Section four provides evidence of nonlinear patterns on 
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the basis of a piecewise linear analysis and nonlinear threshold regressions. Finally, 
Section five summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
2. Motivation for nonlinear patterns in accruals  
 
 
Loan-loss reserves and other accruals can exhibit nonlinear dynamics as a 
function of the level of earnings for several reasons. The compensation theory offers us 
a reasonable explanation to justify such patterns, although this is not the only 
possibility. In this section, we survey the main arguments and the literature in the 
compensation theory and corporate finance that support a potential nonlinear relation 
between accruals and earnings. 
 
Traditionally, the financial industry has offered large personal short-term 
performance bonuses and other variable compensation schemes to managers who are 
able to accomplish corporative goals.2 There exists substantial heterogeneity, but most 
executive compensation packages contain two basic elements: a fixed salary and a 
variable component that typically includes annual bonus tied to accounting 
performance, stock options and long-term incentive plans; see Murphy (1999) for a 
detailed survey. Empirical studies in the field have shown that although top executives 
are better paid in the US than in any other country (Abowd and Bognanno, 1995), the 
average size of the variable component relative to the total is greater as well (Murphy, 
1999) and tends to reward the success in the short-term over the long-term. Hence, US 
top executives have strong incentives to seek short-term gains (Bebchuk, 2009) and 
misreport in their self-interest. The literature has indeed provided evidence on the 
empirical links between executives’ compensation packages and their incentives to 
manipulate earnings; see, among others, Gao and Shrieves (2002), Cohen, Dey and Lys 
(2004), Cheng and Warfield (2005), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Shuto (2007) 
and Cornett, McNut and Tehranian (2009). 
 
The fundamental premise of the compensation theory is that bank managers 
make corporate decisions attempting to optimize the present value of their bonus plan 
payments. Executives are expected (and encouraged) to use their talent and skills to 
achieve better payments, but in practice they can also use the accounting discretion at 
their disposal to manipulate artificially the reported measures of performance. The 
seminal paper in this area is from Healey (1985), who analyzed the effects of three 
compensation packages that relate annual bonus plans to accounting incentives: annual 
bonuses that are conditioned to the managerial ability to generate earnings above a 
certain lower bound; fixed bonus if the realized earnings exceed a certain upper 
threshold or cap; and a variable bonus when realized earnings range between the lower 
and upper bounds, the so-called incentive zone; 3 see also Kaplan (1985), Barro and 
                                                 
2 In practice, short-term bonuses can represent the largest portion in the total compensation of most top 
executives, a tradition that began when most firms were private partnerships and partners shared directly 
the annual income of the firm. While average bonuses are expected to hover around half a million dollars, 
they are not evenly distributed. For instance, senior banking executives can receive millions, as publicly 
disclosed by many financial firms. 
3 As discussed by Murphy (1999), the characteristic cash bonus plan found in practice is based on this 
retribution scheme, with the performance measure being defined explicitly by at least one measure of 
accounting profit. 
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Barro (1990), Pourciau (1993), Sloan (1993), Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995), 
Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995), Balsam (1998) and Guidry, Leone and Rock 
(1999) for further studies. Depending on the particularities of the bonus plan involved, 
this literature shows that bank managers have very different incentives to manipulate 
earnings and, consequently, use LLP and other accruals in different and even opposite 
ways.  
 
Contrary to the main prediction of the smoothing hypothesis, LLP and other 
accruals could be raised artificially when economic earnings fall below the minimum 
bound necessary to receive any bonus. This earnings-decreasing strategy is generally 
known as “big bath”, “take a bath”, or “saving for a better tomorrow” in the accounting 
literature, since the size of reported losses is increased by anticipating future 
discretionary accruals; see Degeorge, Patel and Zechhauser (1999). The key point of 
this strategy is that it implies no managerial cost at present but it increases the chances 
to receive bonuses in the future. On the other hand, the incentives to understate accruals 
are particularly strong when economic earnings are slightly below the lower bound, 
since managers attempt to report earnings that qualify them to perceive bonuses; see, for 
instance, Degeorge et al. (1999) and Koch and Wall (1999). More generally, managers 
tend to choose earnings-increasing alternatives when earnings fall in the incentive 
region, as reported by Healey (1985), as they wish to increase variable compensations. 
Finally, when economic earnings are so large that they exceed the upper bound of the 
incentive zone, managers tend to increase reserves and provisions to use them in 
unprofitable periods, thereby smoothing reported earnings according to a practice 
generally known as “cookie-jar accounting”, or “saving-for-a-rainy-day”; see the 
evidence reported by Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995). These incentives are 
mainly related but not limited to bonus plans, since the nonlinear payoffs embedded in 
stock options generate similar patterns as well; see Gao and Shrieves (2002). 
Consequently, the compensation theory predicts a more complex, possibly non-linear 
relation between LLP and earnings than the income-smoothing theory.  
 
Alternatively, the literature in corporate finance also provides arguments that 
may justify the existence of nonlinear patterns in discretionary accruals as a function of 
realized earnings because of a conflict of interest between firms’ insiders and outsiders. 
In particular, Zingales (1994) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that insiders have 
incentives to conceal their private control benefits from outsiders because, if these 
benefits are detected, outsiders will likely take disciplinary actions. Hence, Leuz, Nanda 
and Wysocki (2003) point out that managers and controlling owners have incentives to 
manage reported earnings to mask the true performance of the firm and reduce the 
likelihood of an outsider intervention. For instance, bank managers would use their 
financial reporting discretion to overstate earnings attempting to conceal losses that 
would prompt outsider interference, or increase reserves to understated earnings in years 
of particularly good performance and use them in years of bad performance.  
 
 
3. Empirical links between LLP and earnings: linear 
regression analysis 
 
In this section, we apply the standard linear regression analysis on data from a 
panel of banks in the US to discuss preliminary the effects of potentially neglected 
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nonlinear patterns in accruals. As in the related literature, our main focus is to detect 
earnings management and, more specifically, income smoothing. In Section 4 we shall 
apply nonlinear techniques that generalize the analysis and allow more general forms of 
earnings management. 
 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The data analyzed in this paper comes from Orbis Bureau Van Dijk and 
comprises annual banking variables from the US in the period 1999-2008, totalling 
81,568 observations from 9,442 banks. We collect observations for firm-specific 
variables that the previous literature has pointed out as potential drivers of the 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components of LLP. These include variables such as 
Total Assets, Loans, Impaired Loans, Loans Loss Provision, Profit before Tax and Total 
Capital Ratio. Additionally, we observe macroeconomic data (Gross Domestic Product 
growth) available from the IMF database to capture the general influence of the 
business cycle on the LLP dynamics, as this is expected to be a main driver of the non-
discretionary component of the allowance.  
 
Table 1 reports the usual descriptive analysis for the main variables involved in 
the regression analysis. Panel A shows that LLP represent around 0.28% of total assets 
on average, with a standard deviation of 0.82%. In the case of impaired loans, this 
figure represents 0.51% of total assets. The total amount of loans relative to total assets 
is 63.86%, with a deviation of 15.86%. The variable of most interest in this paper, 
profits before taxes and LLP (PB), shows a mean value of 1.45% over total assets, but 
with a slight high relative standard deviation of 2.59%. Panel B shows the conditional 
distribution of this variable according to whether it takes negative, zero or positive 
values. A distinctive feature of earnings in the banking industry is the predominance of 
positive values. In our sample, nearly 94% of the observations correspond to positive 
earnings.  
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
Table 2 shows the sample correlations between all the variables used in our 
analysis. There is a positive relation between LLP and impaired loans, as a proxy of 
credit risk exposure, and total loans, as a measure of credit portfolio. The linear 
correlations among the different explanatory variables in our analysis range from -0.39 
to 0.14 and suggest mild dependences. The strongest correlation with the variable 
representative of loan-loss provisioning is the ratio of impaired loans to total assets 
(0.33), followed by the ratio of profits before taxes and LLP to total assets (0.21).  
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
3.2 Income-smoothing hypothesis 
 
To formally test for the earnings-smoothing hypothesis, we characterize the 
dynamics of LLP through a linear model that relates this variable to profits before taxes 
and the remaining control variables; see, among others, Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas 
(1999). In particular, we assume that the relative level of loan provisioning of the i-th 
bank at the t-th year obeys the following dynamics: 
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where it  is a noise process assumed to obey general, standard restrictions, 
0 5)( ,..., ',    and: 
- itLLPTA  measures total LLP deflated by the firm’s Total Assets.  
- itILTA  gauges Impaired Loans to Total Assets to proxy for the credit risk exposures.   
- itLTA represents Loans to Total Assets, widely considered as a proxy for the 
specialization of the bank and a measure of portfolio composition.  
- tGDPG  is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP, hereafter) growth, intended to proxy for 
the general economic conditions and business cycle dynamics.  
- itTCR  is the Total Capital ratio and proxies for the level of solvency of banks.  
- itSIZE  is the natural logarithm of total assets to control for potential size effects. 
- itControlVar  is a (6x1) vector containing a constant and all the control variables 
described thus far. We shall use this variable to simplify mathematical expressions in 
the sequel. 
- itPB  is the Profit before Tax and LLP deflated by Total Assets, the main variable of 
interest in our analysis.  
 
Equation (1) is analogous to most of the empirical models used for testing 
income and/or capital management in the accounting literature. The variables ILTA  and 
LTA  are firm-specific proxies of the credit risk which characterizes the 
nondiscretionary component in LLP. These variables are expected to have a positive 
effect on LLP, since bank managers increase provisions when the bank’s credit portfolio 
increases or when credit quality deteriorates. The variable GDPG  proxies for the 
overall economic conditions as an external indicator of the credit risk. It is expected to 
have a negative effect on the loan loss provisioning. The variable TCR  aims to gauge 
the discretionary use of provisions to manage regulatory capital. If bank managers have 
incentives to manage regulatory capital via LLP (e.g., using LLP to reduce the expected 
regulatory costs associated with violating capital requirements), then we should be able 
to observe a negative relation between LLP and capital ratios. The variable SIZE is 
included as a control variable. We do not have any firm prior expectation about the 
impact of size on LLP: on the one hand larger banks may require larger provisions 
(positive relation), but on the other hand larger banks may be able to diversify credit 
risk better (negative relation). Our main interest in this model is on the   parameter, 
which relates the relative level of provisioning to before-provisions profit. If the 
resultant estimate is significant, then LLP are discretionarily set as a linear function of 
earnings, thus suggesting that reported earnings result from earnings manipulation. 
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Equation (1) is estimated through pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions 
with two-way cluster-robust standard errors accounting for bank and year clusters 
(Petersen, 2009; Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor 2010; Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 
2011; Thompson, 2011).4 The distinctive characteristic of multi-way clustered errors in 
the pooled regression setting is that it allows us to carry out statistical inference which is 
robust by design to simultaneous dependences of unknown form in both the cross-
sectional and time-series dimensions of the panel. Regression errors are assumed to be 
independent but not identically distributed across a number of clusters and can have 
fairly general patterns of within cluster correlation and heteroskedasticity. Additionally, 
we consider panel-data with fixed-effects regressions, as indicated by the Hausman test. 
The main advantage of the panel-data methodology is that it allows us to control for the 
unobservable individual heterogeneity, i.e., the individual characteristics that are not 
explicitly included in the empirical regressions. The main outcomes from this analysis 
(estimated parameters, robust p-values of the t-statistic for individual significance, and 
adjusted goodness of fit) are reported in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
As expected, LLP are positively and significantly related to the variables that 
proxy for the credit risk conditions in the nondiscretionary component. Increments in 
the relative level of impaired loans and/or in the credit portfolio lead to increments of 
LLP. Also, and as reported in the related literature, LLP exhibits a cyclical pattern 
evidenced through the negative and significant dependence on the GDP growth. The 
analysis on the estimated coefficient related to the capital variable shows mixed 
evidence and is sensitive to the estimation technique. While pooled regression with 
cluster-robust standard errors shows a positive and significant relationship, the panel 
data methodology shows a negative and significant coefficient. The latter agrees with 
the empirical evidence in Moyer (1990), Beatty et al. (1995) and Ahmed et al. (1999), 
among others, and suggests that managers use LLP to reduce the expected regulatory 
costs associated with capital requirements.5 A similar result is obtained in the estimated 
coefficient related to the size control variable. 
 
Turning our attention to the coefficient related to the income variable, the 
estimate is 0.068, in the pooled regression, and 0.048, in the panel data regression. Both 
estimates are positive and significant, although the evidence in the panel data regression 
is only marginally significant at the conventional level. The main conclusion from this 
analysis, therefore, is that US bank managers in the period analyzed tend to engage in 
income-smoothing practices. 
 
 
3.3 Tests for robustness of results 
 
In an influential paper, Kraft, Leone and Wasley (2006) argue that several 
results in the empirical testing of accrual-related variables may be due to influential 
                                                 
4 We have also considered the total capital ratio and year as clusters and also the deciles of size and total 
capital ratio in order to control for cross-sectional dependences. The use of deciles may be desirable when 
the number of clusters is too high. The results are robust to the use of all these variables and are available 
upon request. 
5 This result is also obtained under the pooled regression analysis after allowing nonlinear responses of 
LLP to the earnings variable (section 4). 
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observations (outliers) in the sample. As a robustness check of the consistency of the 
previous results to this consideration, we consider three different approaches based on 
Trimmed Least Squares (TLS henceforth) that remove a fraction %  (winsorize) of the 
total sample, with  1,2.5,5,10   set arbitrarily.  
 
The first approach removes influential observations, which are identified as the 
largest prediction errors from equation (1). Specifically, given the estimated residuals 
from (1), the model is estimated again after excluding the observations corresponding to 
the largest %  of squared residuals. The second approach focuses on values in the tails 
of the distribution of earnings, as this is the main variable of interest in our analysis. We 
remove observations corresponding to earnings equal to or larger than the (1 )%  
percentile of this variable, and then estimate equation (1) with the remaining 
observations. The third approach follows identically, this time removing observations 
related to the / 2%  and (1 ) / 2%  percentiles of the empirical distribution of the 
earnings variable, i.e., winsorizing both tails. Table 4 and 5 report the results for the 
pooled regression cross-sectional analysis and the panel-data analysis, respectively. We 
discuss directly the results related to the earnings variable from the pooled analysis, 
since the main qualitative conclusions from the panel-data analysis are rather similar. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
The robust analysis shows that the estimates related to the profit before taxes and 
LLP variable (PB variable) and, hence, the overall evidence for income smoothing, are 
fairly sensitive to values in the tails of the distribution of earnings and large estimation 
errors in the linear fitting. The TLS analysis reveals that after removing the observations 
that raise the largest prediction errors in the linear fitting, the estimates of the slope 
coefficient related to PB dramatically decrease. Under the second approach (removing 
observations related to the top percentile of earnings), we observe that the preliminary 
evidence of income smoothing completely vanishes after removing even a small 
fraction of observations. For all the cases analyzed, the estimates of the slope coefficient 
on PB are negative and significant. The estimates are fairly robust to the different 
trimming fractions and yield a value around -0.06. This evidence suggests that a small 
fraction of observations of the top percentiles may largely be responsible for the overall 
evidence of smoothing in the sample. Finally, similar results emerge when we winsorize 
both tails of the distribution of PB. For the trimming fractions  2.5%,5%  , the 
estimates are negative and significant. On the other hand, applying a relatively large 
trimming factor that removes the 5 and 95 per cent levels of the distribution leads to 
positive values of the PB coefficient. The main conclusions from this analysis can be 
summarized as follows. 
 
First, the overall evidence from the robust analysis tends to favor a negative 
relation between LLP and earnings such that the relative level of LLP is reduced 
(increased) deliberately when earnings are positive (negative). The effect of this strategy 
is to increase the total volatility on reported earnings, in sharp opposition to the main 
prediction of the earnings smoothing hypothesis. This result agrees with the recent 
findings in Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), who observe similar evidence using a sample 
of 186 European banks. While the income-smoothing theory fails to explain this feature, 
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the evidence may be the result of bank managers attempting to maximize the present 
value of their performance-based compensations, as claimed by the compensation 
hypothesis. For most banks in the sample, which report positive earnings, a negative 
relation between LLP and earnings suggests income-increasing policies. This evidence 
would support the claims in Watts and Zimmerman (1986), who argue that bank 
managers with earnings-based compensations have always the incentive to manipulate 
earnings upwards. For the subset of banks with negative earnings, the negative relation 
implies “big-bath” or income-decreasing techniques that would attempt to increase the 
probability of reporting future earnings. Again, this may be consistent with strategies 
intended to maximize the present value of their intertemporal stream of expected 
wealth. 
 
Second, the evidence supporting smoothing behaviors obtained from the 
standard analysis in our sample seems to be largely originated in a relatively small 
group of observations in the upper tail of the income distribution. When these 
observations are arbitrarily removed, the statistical evidence for smoothing weakens and 
eventually vanishes completely. However, the question that arises in this case refers to 
whether it is correct to conclude that bank managers do not engage in earnings 
smoothing practices when we delete the observations precisely for which bank 
managers have stronger incentives to apply these practices. Observations that do not 
seem to be fitted correctly by a linear model are not necessarily the consequence of 
“outliers” or “measurement errors” in the data, but also a symptom for model 
misspecification. Strictly speaking, removing observations arbitrarily is not a proper 
way of proceeding, since it may introduce selection bias and neglect meaningful 
patterns of the data. A more rigorous analysis would attempt to capture potentially 
neglected patterns. Since we have both theoretical reasons and previous evidence 
suggesting the likely existence of nonlinear patterns, we attempt to capture this in the 
following section.  
 
 
4. Capturing nonlinear responses in loan-loss 
provisioning 
 
 
In view of the preliminary evidence in the previous section, we extend the 
econometric analysis to account for potential nonlinear responses in the discretionay 
management of earnings as a function of the size of earnings. Our basic aim is to 
generalize equation (1) to allow the slope coefficient of LLP on PB to vary according to 
this variable, i.e., generalizing (1) by considering models within the general class of 
random coefficient regressions.  
 
                      ' itit it it itLLPTA ControlVar PB                                    (2) 
 
where, in our analysis, it  is restricted to being a fixed function of itPB , and a set of 
unknown parameters  , i.e.,  ;itit f PB   . For example, the asymmetric-response 
model considered, among others, in Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) can be embedded in 
this general approach setting    0 10 0 ,it itit I PB I PB       where  I ?  is an 
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indicator variable taking value one if the condition in parenthesis is true and zero 
otherwise, and 0 1, )´(   ; see Section 4.2 for further details. 
 
Throughout the following subsections, we consider different functional 
specifications embedded in this general approach that grow in econometric complexity. 
The first one is a piecewise linear model that relates LLP to different statistical classes 
formed by the empirical deciles of PB in our sample. This approach is very intuitive, but 
provides direct evidence for or against the nonlinear hypothesis through the estimates of 
coefficients. Piecewise linear models have been used, among others, in Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006) and Anderson et al. (2009). A potential shortcoming of these 
models is that the classes or regimes are determined arbitrarily, e.g., fixing ranks or, in 
our case, deciles. Therefore, our second approach to accommodate possible 
nonlinearities uses threshold nonlinear regressions, as these allow us to circumvent this 
problem by determining classes endogenously. 
 
 
4.1 Piecewise linear analysis  
 
Let 1 9,...,   be the empirical deciles of the distribution of ,itPB  i.e., 
  : inf Pr 0.1 , 1,...,9.s it sPB s s     Given these values, the range of PBit, can be 
partitioned into ten disjointed subsets, ranges, or statistical classes, which we shall 
denote as 1 10,..., ,R R  defined as 1 1( , ],R   …, 1( , ],...,s s sR   10 9( , ),R    
s=2,…,9. Note that the sample probability of PBit being at any of these intervals is 10%. 
Then, define a sequence of dummy variables on the classes sR ,  101( ) ,Dit s sR   such that 
( )Dit sR  takes a value equal to one if the earnings observation of the i-th bank at time t 
belongs to sR , and zero otherwise. Then, in order to capture nonlinear patterns arising 
from variability in it  as a function of itPB  in (2), we can consider a piecewise linear 
model defined on the deciles of itPB  characterized as 
10
1
( ),Dit s
s
sit R 

   or, 
equivalently: 
 
                 10
1
, ( )' Dit it it s
s
si t itPB RLLPTA ControlVar  

                        (3) 
The choice of deciles is entirely arbitrary but seeks to obtain a good compromise 
between the goals of capturing a potentially wide range of variation in the (conditional) 
response of LLP to PB and keeping the model parsimony in the econometric approach.6 
Hence, the sequence of parameters  s  captures the marginal response of LLP to 
earnings in each decile after controlling for the remaining variables. Because the model 
is linear in variables, all the coefficients involved can be estimated jointly and 
                                                 
6 The unobservable function that characterizes the link between the relative levels of LLP and PB could 
be approximated arbitrarily well through a piecewise linear function when the number of segments 
included in the expansion is arbitrarily large and the function to be approached is smooth enough. In 
practice, however, there exists a trade-off between the number of parameters to be estimated in a 
regression model and the number of segments to be included in a finite-sample analysis.  
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consistently through least-squares. Under the restriction of homogenous response across 
the distribution of PB, i.e., 0 1 10: ...H      , model (1) arises as a particular case, 
since trivially 
1,10
( ) 1Dit s
s
R

 . Hence, the statistical suitability of the linear model can 
readily be tested through a standard F-type test. Furthermore, the different implications 
in terms of earnings-management that the varying coefficients can capture can be 
analyzed statistically through different restrictions. For instance, if all the estimates of 
s  are positive, but differ significantly among themselves, then the analysis provides 
support to the income-smoothing hypothesis and, furthermore, reveals different average 
propensities to use LLP as a smoothing instrument depending on the size of earnings. 
On the other hand, if any of these parameters is significantly negative, the results would 
support the existence of earnings-increasing strategies for ranges formed with positive 
values, or earnings-decreasing behavior for the negative classes. Because our main 
interest is on the estimated slope coefficients  101s s  , we summarize graphically the 
estimated coefficients in Figure 1 and discuss the main results for the sake of 
conciseness and saving space. Complete results from this regression are available upon 
request. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
Figure 1 reveals that the sensitivity of LLP to earnings varies considerably 
across the deciles of the earnings variables, showing an upward trending function that 
takes negative values in the lower deciles and positive values in the larger. The figure 
suggests a strong degree of nonlinear behavior which is formally supported by joint 
tests of significance. The suitability of a single linear model characterized by a unique 
coefficient which implies 0 1 10: ...H     is strongly rejected, and so is the hypothesis 
of absence of earnings management, 0 1 10: ... 0H     .7 Consequently, the estimates 
of model (3) provide formal evidence that the dynamics of LLP are better characterized 
by nonlinear features rather than a constant proportional relation, and that bank 
managers use LLP to over-state or under-state reported earnings in their self-interest. 
The adjusted goodness of fit largely improves from 15.43% in the restricted model (1), 
to 19.63% in (3), roughly representing an increment of 30%.  
 
It is interesting to discuss in greater detail the coefficient estimates and the 
implications for earnings management. The slope related to the first decile of PB is 
largely negative 1ˆ( 0.10)    and strongly significant (p-value is 0.00). Since this class 
is formed mainly by negative earnings (negative earnings represent around 6% of the 
total sample), the analysis suggests that managers tend to use LLP in this region as an 
earnings-decreasing tool applying “big-bath” accounting. The estimate of the slope 
coefficient in the second decile is again negative 2ˆ( 0.14)   and largely significant. 
This class comprises strictly positive, but relatively small profits. The evidence suggests 
that bank managers engage in earnings-increasing strategies by discretionarily reducing 
LLP, attempting to avoid reporting small negative earnings; see also Degeorge, Patel 
and Zechhauser (1999). For earnings falling into the subsequent categories, we observe 
                                                 
7 The F-test for the joint hypothesis of a common management strategy is 424.1, largely rejected at any of 
the conventional levels of significance. 
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a sequence of negative estimates in an upward trend 3 9ˆ ˆ( 0.09,..., 0.02)     , which 
suggest that the incentives to use LLP as an earnings-increasing device decrease 
progressively as the size of earnings increases. All these values are statistically 
significant. Finally, for earnings in the top decile of the distribution, the estimate is 
largely positive 10ˆ( 0.09)  and highly significant. This corresponds to the income-
smoothing hypothesis and suggests that large profits tend to be smoothed by increasing 
the size of LLP.  
 
Note that the results in this analysis are coherent with the evidence based on the 
robust analysis in the linear analysis in section 3.3, but offer us a more complete picture. 
While both analyses agree and suggest that the most common strategy employed by 
bank managers in this sample is to increase the size of reported earnings by 
discretionarily reducing LLP, the piecewise linear analysis reveals that different 
strategies coexist depending on the size of earnings. For the set of largest earnings in the 
sample we observe strong evidence of earnings smoothing, whereas large relative losses 
are artificially increased by deliberately increasing LLP in take-a-bath strategies. The 
statistical evidence largely rejects the hypothesis of overall smoothing in the sample and 
suggests a more general type of managerial behaviour.   
 
 
4.2 Threshold nonlinear regression models 
 
Piecewise linear regression with pre-defined regimes is a fairly intuitive analysis 
that provides formal evidence and allows us to grasp the pattern of variable dependence 
that links LLP to earnings. However, a potential critique is that the overall evidence 
may be sensitive to the arbitrary choice of the classes that characterize the stepwise 
function it . We note that a similar analysis has been applied previously by Laeven and 
Majnoni (2006), Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), and Balboa, López-Espinosa and Rubia 
(2010), who focus on asymmetric responses of LLP around the zero-earnings threshold,  
 
                     * 0' it it it it itit itPB PB PBLLPTA ControlVar D                        (4) 
where  0it itPBD   is a dummy variable that takes value one if itPB  is positive and 
zero otherwise. Like (3), this nonlinear generalization of model (1) reflects the arbitrary 
choice of threshold levels, although it has the advantage of being naturally motivated to 
capture asymmetries around gains and losses. In this section, we generalize both 
approaches by allowing different regimes as a function of unknown thresholds that can 
be estimated endogenously. 
 
In particular, assume that there exists some unknown threshold value in the 
income variable, say  , such that the propensity to manage earnings for earnings below 
this threshold is captured by, say, the 1  coefficient, whereas the propensity to smooth 
earnings above this level is captured by 2,  with 2 1.   Hence, similar to (4), we 
may specify the following econometric model: 
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   1 2' it it it it it it itit itPB PB PB PBLLPTA ControlVar D D                       (5)             
Obviously, the linear model (1) arises as a particular case under the restriction 1 2.   
Similarly, this approach generalizes the basic setting considered in the previous section, 
since the regime is not predetermined exogenously a priori by the researcher, but rather 
endogenously from the data. For instance, the asymmetric model (4) is encompassed in 
this setting under 0   and a trivial parameter rearrangement.  
 
Model (5) is a particular model of the general class of models embedded in (2) 
known as threshold nonlinear model, which can be further generalized towards 
accounting for multiple regimes. Thus, consider the set of (unknown) threshold values 
1 2 ... ,n      n>1, partitioning the empirical range of itPB  into n+1 disjoint 
intervals, 1, 1,,..., nR R  , and assume that ,( ),it sRD   1,..., 1,s n   is a collection of 
dummy variables taking value one if the value of PBit falls in the ,sR   region, and zero 
otherwise. Then, model (5) is straightforward and generalized as: 
 
                        
1
,
1
( )'
n
it s it s it
s
it itR PBLLPTA ControlVar D   


                                (6) 
These are the so-called threshold models discussed, among others, by Tong (1983, 
1990), Chan (1993), Hansen (1999, 2000), and Caner and Hansen (2004). These are 
fairly parsimonious and emerge as special cases of more sophisticated frameworks, such 
as mixture models, Markov Switching models, and smooth transition models, all of 
which are characterized by the possibility of nonlinear patterns. The unknown 
parameters  to be estimated are the slope coefficients that characterize the conditional 
mean,  1 1, ,..., ,' n    and the threshold values  1,..., n   that give rise to the different 
regimes. The vector parameter   can be consistently estimated from a concentrated 
least-squares procedures, as is briefly summarized below. 
 
For simplicity, consider the simplest case involving a single threshold parameter, 
.  The unknown vector of parameters is 0 5 1 2( ,..., , , , ) '       and its natural 
estimator is the minimizer of the sum of squared residuals, which is also equivalent to 
the maximum-likelihood estimator when the residuals are normally distributed. If we 
knew the true value of ,  the remaining parameters could be estimated consistently by 
least-squares because, as in the previous section, the parameters are linear conditional to 
the regimes that characterizes .  This property suggests an estimation strategy in which 
we can identify sequentially the whole set of unknown parameters by minimizing the 
concentrated sum of squared residuals conditional to values of the  parameter in a wide 
range. More specifically, for any posited value of ,  we can generate the dummy 
variable  0it itPBD  , and then compute the sum of squared least-squares residuals 
from a least-squares fitting conditional to this choice. In practice, we can use the 
observed values of itPB  within a certain range, say ,  that ensures that at least a 
minimal percentage of the observations (in our case, we set 1%) lies in each regime. 
The least-squares estimation of the parameters is the overall minimizer of the residual 
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variance in ,  which can be reduced to searching over values of  equalling the 
distinct values of the process itPB  in the sample, i.e.,    1 2 2, ,ˆ ˆarg min |ijE      . 
The estimated value of   is that for which the sum of square residuals is minimized. 
Multiple thresholds can be inferred similarly using sequential estimation as in the 
change-point literature; see Hansen (1999) for details. 
 
For the set of parameters that characterize the conditional mean of the process, 
 1 1, ,..., ,' n     we can generally carry out standard inference based on the estimates 
of the covariance matrix, as in the linear case. However, testing certain restrictions, 
involves a more complex procedure. In particular, if we want to test the suitability of the 
model against a linear restricted model (i.e., whether the threshold effects are 
statistically significant), it should be noted that under the linear restriction 
0 ,1 , 1: ...E E nH     the threshold values involved are not identified, so the distribution 
of the usual tests (e.g., the Likelihood-ratio test or the F-test) is not standard. The 
relevant critical values have to be tabulated by experimental methods such as bootstrap. 
We shall bear this in mind when testing the convenience of the restricted linear model in 
this general setting. 
 
 
4.3 Estimation results 
 
 We estimate model (6) with one and two threshold levels and, for completeness, 
we also analyzed the asymmetric model (4) as this has been considered in the previous 
literature. The estimated models are labelled as follows. Model I is the baseline model 
with constant slope coefficient in equation (1). Model II is the asymmetric model with a 
threshold set at the zero earnings level considered in the previous literature, i.e., 
equation (4). Model III generalizes this specification by allowing the threshold value to 
be determined endogenously in threshold regression, i.e., equation (5). Model IV 
analyzes a further extension of Models II and III by considering both a threshold effect 
at the zero level (asymmetry) and an unknown threshold which is estimated 
endogenously. Finally, Model V further relaxes this model and considers two unknown 
thresholds effects, i.e., equation (6), setting n=2. The results from the pooled regression 
are reported in Table 6.8  
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
Some comments follow. First, as expected from the previous analysis, we 
observe that any econometric model that accommodates the possibility of nonlinear 
responses of LLP to the level of earnings largely over-performs the linearly restricted 
specification in Model I. The statistical gains in terms of adjusted goodness of fit show 
increments ranging from 20%, when including asymmetric effects in Model II, to nearly 
34%, when including two threshold levels in Models IV and V. Furthermore, all the 
models generate negative and statistically significant estimates for the coefficients 
related to some of the regions analyzed in each specification, from which the hypothesis 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that these models have also been estimated through the use of panel data 
methodologies. The results are very similar and are available upon request. 
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of overall earnings smoothing is rejected in favour of more general managerial 
strategies in all the cases analyzed.  
 
Second, the estimates of asymmetric Model II, corresponding to equation (4), 
lead to similar conclusions as those in Laeven and Majnoni (2006) and Balboa et al. 
(2010). In particular, bank managers tend to engage in “big-bath” techniques when 
banks generate negative earnings (the estimated value of the negative earnings-related 
coefficient is -0.133), whereas banks with positive earnings would on average apply 
smoothing techniques (the estimated coefficient is 0.090). The likelihood ratio test 
testing the suitability of the unrestricted, asymmetric model against the linear restricted 
specification largely rejects the null hypothesis in favour of asymmetric effects.  
 
Third, Model III, corresponding to equation (5), generalizes the study treated in 
Model II by allowing the model to determine endogenously the most likely position of a 
threshold effect. As in the change-point literature, this is identified as the sample for 
which there is maximum evidence against the hypothesis of parameter constancy in the 
whole sample, i.e., the point at which the most important parameter discontinuity (not 
necessarily the unique) appears in the sample. In our case, the analysis suggests that the 
most important change when only a single threshold is allowed is not related to whether 
earnings are positive or negative, but rather to whether income is large enough to be 
smoothed or not. More specifically, earnings (deflated by assets) exceeding a threshold 
of 3.64% are smoothed through a propensity coefficient estimated at 0.097. This 
estimate is considerably greater that the on-average value reported under Model I, and is 
of the same order as the estimate attached to positive earnings in Model II. The 
threshold corresponds to the 98th percentile of the earnings variable, thus showing that 
the propensity to smooth is particularly high when the size of economic earnings is also 
high. For earnings not exceeding this threshold, we observe an average propensity 
coefficient which is negative (-0.077) and significant, thus suggesting that bank 
managers tend predominantly to use LLP discretionarily as an earnings-decreasing 
(increasing) tool when earnings are negative (positive, small and medium-sized). The 
bootstrap test for the linear hypothesis 0 ,1 ,2: E EH    is largely rejected through the 
sup-Wald statistic as in Hansen (1999).  
 
Four, Model IV and V generalize the previous analysis by exploring the 
existence of multiple threshold effects. The results from Model IV show that 
considering the asymmetric effect (i.e., imposing a threshold at zero) in addition to the 
threshold analyzed in Model III provides an improvement in the overall goodness of fit 
of the model, but the increments are now much less important, yet still relevant. In this 
case, the estimate associated to negative earnings is negative and significant (-0.100), 
while the estimate associated to earnings between zero and the upper threshold is 
negative and significant, but much smaller (-0.056). Extreme earnings keep having a 
large propensity to be smoothed, as already determined under Model III. Finally, Model 
V provides a more complete picture by allowing for two threshold effects. Together 
with the threshold identified in Models III and IV, a new threshold value is now 
estimated around a level of relative earnings of 1.81%, which roughly corresponds to 
the 68th percentile in the empirical distribution of the earnings variable. The estimated 
coefficients related to the three earnings classes are -0.107 (lower class, below 1.81%), -
0.049 (medium class, within 1.81% and 3.64%), and 0.097 (upper class, above 3.64%). 
The differences between these estimates are important enough as to strongly reject the 
null hypothesis of overall equality between coefficients (both vis-à-vis and overly) 
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through bootstrap-based tests. When comparing the overall fitting of this model in 
relation to Model IV, we observe that allowing the threshold value to be estimated 
rather than fixed it at zero yields a slight increment. The difference, however, between 
setting 0 : 0H   or allowing this parameter to be freely estimated is both economically 
and statistically significant, as determined by a bootstrapped F-test. 
 
The overall evidence from Model V suggests that the propensity to increase 
reported earnings decreases with the size of earnings and, eventually, disappears and is 
reverted towards smoothing when earnings are particularly large. This evidence is 
similar to that in Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), although we offer a more complete 
picture and significant comments. The regimes are identified as a relatively large 
negative propensity to use LLP on the size of earnings (68% of the sample), a much 
smaller, but still negative and significant propensity (20% of the sample), and a large 
positive propensity to smooth the greatest profits (2%). Therefore, we observe that, 
depending on the size and sign of economic earnings, LLP can be used in very different 
ways to manipulate reported earnings. In our sample, and according to the empirical 
results from the threshold regression methodology, “big-bath”, income-increasing, and 
smoothing practices coexist. 
 
Finally, Figures 2 and 3 relate, respectively, the nonlinear patterns estimated 
from Models IV and V to the dynamics suggested by regression analysis on the earnings 
deciles in the previous subsection. We can observe that the threshold estimates identify 
three regions in which, essentially, the propensity to use LLP is, on average, remarkably 
negative, mild negative, and positive. Since the threshold regression assume discrete 
regimes, we observe that the smooth, continuous pattern that the decile-regression 
evidences is captured through coefficient estimates that average the different 
propensities, basically capturing an upward trend in the propensity to smooth.  
 
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 around here] 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we have discussed the existence of non-linear patterns that 
characterize the systematic response of the loan-loss provision to the profit before taxes. 
The central point in this paper is that discretionary accruals, such as loan-loss 
provisioning, may, in practice, exhibit nonlinear patterns on earnings stemming from 
different managerial incentives to use accruals as a tool to either increase or decrease 
reported earnings depending on the sign and the magnitude of this variable. This 
hypothesis can be founded in the existence of thresholds embedded in performance-
based compensation plans that determine the expected payments of bank managers. 
While extending the analysis to accommodate possible nonlinearities is straightforward, 
neglecting such patterns in the empirical analysis may result in misleading conclusions 
to the existence and the extent of earnings management strategies. 
 
Our empirical analysis on the US banking industry reveals the existence of 
strong nonlinear patterns between loan-loss provisioning and earnings that suggest that 
bank managers engage actively in different earnings management strategies as a 
function of the magnitude of earnings. We find strong evidence suggesting that income-
 19
smoothing practices are systemically applied on the largest earnings, but the hypothesis 
of the overall predominance of this behavior is largely rejected. According to our 
results, earnings-increasing behaviors are a more likely behavior than any other earnings 
management strategy when earnings are positive, while loan-loss provisions tend to be 
overstated to increase the size of reported losses when earnings are negative.  
 
These conclusions provide indirect evidence that supports the main claims in the 
compensation theory. Our analysis does not use specific information on compensation 
plans. This is an issue for further research, since data on executive compensation would 
help to understand the reasons underlying the smoothing practices. However the 
empirical analysis of this issue would have to be limited to the sample of listed banks, 
thus limiting the scope of the threshold analysis. Even without those data, common 
patterns at the individual level emerge on average and can be identified from panel data 
using nonlinear regression techniques. If the analysis does not allow for the possibility 
of nonlinear patterns, the overall evidence from a linear regression model supports the 
income-smoothing hypothesis because of the strong influence of the largest 
observations. 
 
A major conclusion from this paper, therefore, is that neglected nonlinear 
patterns can affect the results from standard analyses, which perhaps may explain some 
of the contradictory findings observed in the previous literature. A further generalization 
of the empirical analysis presented in this paper may consider so-called Smooth 
Transition Regression that models transition from one regime to another as a continuous 
process dependent on the transition variable. The evidence in this paper seems to point 
out that the characteristic response of loan-loss provisioning to the size of the earnings 
variable may be better characterized in such terms. This interesting topic is left for 
future research. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Estimated coefficients in the decile pooled time-series cross-sectional 
regressions in equation (2). 
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Figure 2. Estimated coefficients in the decile pooled time-series cross-sectional 
regressions in equation (3) together with the estimates from Model IV. The dotted 
and dashed-dotted lines show, respectively, the position of the zero-earnings 
threshold, and the estimated threshold values. The numbers related to each regime 
are the values of the estimated coefficients of LLP on earnings in Model IV. 
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Figure 3. Estimated coefficients in the decile pooled time-series cross-sectional 
regressions in equation (3) together with the estimates from Model V. The dotted 
and dashed-dotted lines show, respectively, the position of the lower and upper 
estimated threshold values. The figures related to each regime are the values of the 
estimated coefficients of LLP on earnings in Model V. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A       
Variable Observ. Mean 25% Median 75% Standard Deviation 
Bank variables       
LLPTA 81,568 0.0028 0.0004 0.0014 0.0030 0.0082 
ILTA 81,434 0.0051 0.0002 0.0020 0.0060 0.0102 
LTA 81,568 0.6386 0.5484 0.6595 0.7517 0.1586 
TCR 81,324 18.4179 11.9000 14.5000 19.4000 18.4751 
SIZE  81,568 11.8984 10.9993 11.6803 12.5030 1.3342 
PB 81,568 0.0145 0.0099 0.0148 0.0194 0.0259 
Macroeconomic variable       
GDPG 10 2.6229 1.8137 2.5819 3.5733 1.3459 
Panel B       
0itPB   76,693 0.0166 0.0110 0.0153 0.0198 0.0245 
0itPB   4,854 -0.0181 -0.0236 -0.0099 -0.0035 0.0251 
0itPB   21 0 0 0 0 0 
Descriptive statistics of the following variables: LLPTA: total loan loss provisions deflated by firm’s total 
assets; ILTA: impaired loans to total assets; LTA: loans to total assets; TCR: total capital ratio; SIZE: 
natural logarithm of total assets; PB: profit before tax and loan loss provision deflated by total assets; 
GDPG: GDP growth (it should be noted that the number of observations used in the empirical analyses is 
around 81,000, depending on the specified model, since this variable takes the same value each year for 
all the banks in the sample).  
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   Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 LLPTA ILTA LTA TCR SIZE GDPG  PB 
LLPTA 1.00       
ILTA 0.33 1.00      
LTA 0.10 0.14 1.00     
TCR -0.02 -0.08 -0.39 1.00    
SIZE 0.06 0.05 0.14 -0.20 1.00   
GDPG -0.09 -0.18 -0.06 0.03 -0.07 1.00  
PB 0.21 -0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.12 0.04 1.00 
Correlations between the variables included in the empirical analysis. LLPTA: total loan loss provisions 
deflated by firm’s total assets; ILTA: impaired loans to total assets; LTA: loans to total assets; TCR: total 
capital ratio; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; GDPG: GDP growth; PB: profit before tax and loan 
loss provision deflated by total assets. 
Values in bold are significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 3. Estimation of the basic linear model 
Variable Pooled regression  double cluster 
Panel data 
fixed effects 
Constantit 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
0.019 
(0.00) 
ILTAit 
0.248 
(0.00) 
0.258 
(0.00) 
LTAit 
0.004 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
TCRit  
2.32E-5 
(0.00) 
-1.72E-5 
(0.00) 
SIZEit 
1.27E-4 
(0.38) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
GDPGt 
-2.41E-4 
(0.05) 
-3.03E-4 
(0.00) 
PBit 
0.068 
(0.05) 
0.048 
(0.08) 
   
R2 adjusted 0.154 0.143 
Number observations 81,307 81,307 
Estimation of the basic linear model through: a) pooled regression time-series with robust errors 
computed on double cluster (TCR and year); b) panel data methodology with fixed effects (as indicated 
by the Hausman test). Dependent variable LLPTAit: total loan loss provisions deflated by firm’s total 
assets. Independent variables: ILTAit: impaired loans to total assets; LTAit: loans to total assets; TCRit: 
total capital ratio; SIZEit: natural logarithm of total assets; GDPGt: GDP growth; PBit: profit before tax 
and loan loss provision deflated by total assets. Robust p-values in brackets. PB values in bold are 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 4. Trimmed pooled regression with two-way cluster methodology  
Panel A: Deletion of observations related to the largest %  of squared residuals 
Variable 1%  2.5%  5%  10%   
Constantit 
-0.001 
(0.26) 
-0.001 
(0.39) 
-0.001 
(0.19) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
ILTAit 
0.188 
(0.00) 
0.169 
(0.00) 
0.168 
(0.00) 
0.191 
(0.00) 
LTAit 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
TCRit  
9.43E-6 
(0.00) 
8.33E-6 
(0.00) 
7.28E-6 
(0.00) 
6.46E-6 
(0.00) 
SIZEit 
2.95E-5 
(0.54) 
1.83E-5 
(0.68) 
2.79E-5 
(0.52) 
2.98E-5 
(0.23) 
GDPGt 
-1.72E-4 
(0.04) 
-1.32E-4 
(0.04) 
-1.28E-4 
(0.03) 
-1.17E-4 
(0.01) 
PBit 
0.009 
(0.06) 
-2.30E-4 
(0.97) 
0.010 
(0.17) 
0.024 
(0.00) 
R2 adjusted 0.247 0.266 0.293 0.386 
Number observations 80,631 79,548 77,593 73,563 
Panel B: Deletion of observations larger than the  1 %  top percentile of earnings 
Constantit 
1.41E-4 
(0.72) 
4.94E-4 
(0.60) 
6.74E-4 
(0.47) 
9.24E-4 
(0.31) 
ILTAit 
0.221 
(0.00) 
0.228 
(0.00) 
0.230 
(0.00) 
0.228 
(0.00) 
LTAit 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
TCRit  
-5.23E-6 
(0.48) 
-8.30E-6 
(0.01) 
-9.80E-6 
(0.01) 
-1.18E-5 
(0.00) 
SIZEit 
6.44E-5 
(0.45) 
5.14E-5 
(0.61) 
4.38E-5 
(0.64) 
3.36E-5 
(0.74) 
GDPGt 
-1.74E-4 
(0.04) 
-1.63E-4 
(0.06) 
-1.61E-4 
(0.05) 
-1.68E-4 
(0.04) 
PBit 
-0.039 
(0.00) 
-0.059 
(0.00) 
-0.065 
(0.01) 
-0.074 
(0.00) 
R2 adjusted 0.218 0.249 0.256 0.259 
Number observations 80,821 79,659 77,635 73,537 
Panel C: Deletion of observations related to  1 / 2%  top and bottom percentile of earnings 
Constantit 
-0.002 
(0.11) 
1.88E-4 
(0.97) 
4.13E-4 
(0.66) 
2.56E-4 
(0.81) 
ILTAit 
0.215 
(0.00) 
0.210 
(0.00) 
0.218 
(0.00) 
0.214 
(0.00) 
LTAit 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
TCRit  
1.19E-6 
(0.00) 
-6.46E-6 
(0.09) 
-1.43E-5 
(0.00) 
-2.08E-5 
(0.00) 
SIZEit 
7.61E-5 
(0.40) 
5.28E-5 
(0.57) 
4.28E-5 
(0.64) 
3.59E-5 
(0.67) 
GDPGt 
-2.12E-4 
(0.03) 
-1.89E-4 
(0.05) 
-1.87E-4 
(0.04) 
-1.80E-4 
(0.03) 
PBit 
0.042 
(0.00) 
-0.028 
(0.01) 
-0.020 
(0.08) 
0.014 
(0.07) 
R2 adjusted 0.184 0.213 0.226 0.214 
Number observations 80,810 79,723 77,725 73,688 
Trimmed pooled regression time-series with robust errors computed on double cluster (TCR and year). 
Dependent variable LLPTAit: total loan loss provisions deflated by firm’s total assets. Independent variables: 
ILTAit: impaired loans to total assets; LTAit: loans to total assets; TCRit: total capital ratio; SIZEit: natural 
logarithm of total assets; GDPGt: GDP growth; PBit: profit before tax and loan loss provision deflated by total 
assets. Robust p-values in brackets. PB values in bold are significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 5. Trimmed pooled regression with panel data fixed effects 
Panel A: Deletion of observations related to the largest %  of squared residuals 
Variable 1%  2.5%  5%  10%   
Constantit 
0.011 
(0.00) 
0.012 
(0.00) 
0.012 
(0.00) 
0.012 
(0.00) 
ILTAit 
0.193 
(0.00) 
0.181 
(0.00) 
0.180 
(0.00) 
0.189 
(0.00) 
LTAit 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
TCRit  
-7.92E-6 
(0.00) 
-8.95E-6 
(0.00) 
-1.07E-5 
(0.00) 
-1.18E-5 
(0.00) 
SIZEit 
-8.67E-4 
(0.00) 
-9.26E-4 
(0.00) 
-9.43E-4 
(0.00) 
-9.52E-4 
(0.00) 
GDPGt 
-1.91E-4 
(0.00) 
-1.62E-4 
(0.00) 
-1.54E-4 
(0.00) 
-1.53E-4 
(0.00) 
PBit 
-0.005 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
7.91E-5 
(0.95) 
0.010 
(0.00) 
R2 adjusted 0.271 0.296 0.329 0.390 
Number observations 80,493 79,274 77,241 73,176 
Panel B: Deletion of observations larger than the  1 %  top percentile of earnings 
Constantit 
0.011 
(0.00) 
0.011 
(0.00) 
0.011 
(0.00) 
0.010 
(0.00) 
ILTAit 
0.238 
(0.00) 
0.237 
(0.00) 
0.238 
(0.00) 
0.237 
(0.00) 
LTAit 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
TCRit  
-2.15E-5 
(0.00) 
-2.29E-5 
(0.00) 
-2.44E-5 
(0.00) 
-2.54E-5 
(0.00) 
SIZEit 
-7.48E-4 
(0.00) 
-7.46E-4 
(0.00) 
-7.32E-4 
(0.64) 
-7.09E-4 
(0.74) 
GDPGt 
-2.10E-4 
(0.00) 
-1.98E-4 
(0.00) 
-1.91E-4 
(0.00) 
-1.89E-4 
(0.00) 
PBit 
-0.035 
(0.00) 
-0.044 
(0.00) 
-0.050 
(0.00) 
-0.055 
(0.00) 
R2 adjusted 0.217 0.222 0.225 0.225 
Number observations 80,821 79,659 77,635 73,537 
Panel C: Deletion of observations related to  1 / 2%  top and bottom percentile of earnings 
Constantit 
0.013 
(0.00) 
0.011 
(0.00) 
0.010 
(0.00) 
0.009 
(0.00) 
ILTAit 
0.232 
(0.00) 
0.226 
(0.00) 
0.226 
(0.00) 
0.228 
(0.00) 
LTAit 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
TCRit  
-1.79E-5 
(0.00) 
-1.61E-5 
(0.00) 
-2.13E-5 
(0.00) 
-3.55E-5 
(0.00) 
SIZEit 
-9.48E-4 
(0.00) 
-7.62E-4 
(0.00) 
-7.20E-4 
(0.00) 
-6.18E-4 
(0.67) 
GDPGt 
-2.55E-4 
(0.00) 
-2.21E-4 
(0.00) 
-2.17E-4 
(0.00) 
-1.99E-4 
(0.00) 
PBit 
-3.79E-4 
(0.96) 
-0.023 
(0.00) 
-0.014 
(0.01) 
0.025 
(0.00) 
R2 adjusted 0.199 0.206 0.204 0.194 
Number observations 80,810 79,723 77,725 73,688 
Trimmed panel data fixed effects regression with robust errors. Dependent variable LLPTAit: total loan loss 
provisions deflated by firm’s total assets. Independent variables: ILTAit: impaired loans to total assets; LTAit: 
loans to total assets; TCRit: total capital ratio; SIZEit: natural logarithm of total assets; GDPGt: GDP growth; 
PBit: profit before tax and loan loss provision deflated by total assets. Robust p-values in brackets. PB values 
in bold are significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 6. Estimation with two-way cluster methodology 
 Pooled regression double cluster 
Variable M. I M. II M. III M. IV M. V 
Constantit 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.003 
(0.05) 
-0.003 
(0.05) 
-0.002 
(0.14) 
ILTAit 
0.248 
(0.00) 
0.240 
(0.00) 
0.230 
(0.00) 
0.230 
(0.00) 
0.229 
(0.00) 
LTAit 
0.004 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.004 
(0.00) 
0.004 
(0.00) 
0.004 
(0.00) 
TCRit  
2.32E-5 
(0.00) 
-8.45E-6 
(0.05) 
-8.71E-6 
(0.02) 
-1.13E-5 
(0.02) 
-1.48E-5 
(0.00) 
SIZEit 
1.27E-4 
(0.38) 
1.61E-4 
(0.25) 
2.63E-4 
(0.04) 
2.54E-4 
(0.06) 
2.37E-4 
(0.06) 
GDPGt 
-2.41E-4 
(0.05) 
-2.24E-4 
(0.05) 
-1.35E-4 
(0.23) 
-1.44E-4 
(0.20) 
-1.51E-4 
(0.17) 
PBit 
0.068 
(0.05) - - - - 
 0it it itD PB PB   - 0.090 (0.04) - - - 
 0it it itD PB PB   - -0.133 (0.00) - -0.100 (0.00) - 
 0it highit itD PB PB   - - - -0.056 (0.00) - 
 it highit itD PB PB   - - 0.097 (0.04) 0.098 (0.04) 0.097 (0.03) 
 it highit itD PB PB   - - -0.077 (0.00) - - 
 it lowit itD PB PB   - - - - -0.107 (0.00) 
 it low highit itD PB PB    - - - - -0.049 (0.00) 
      
R2 adjusted 0.154 0.186 0.203 0.203 0.206 
Number observations 81,307 81,307 81,307 81,307 81,307 
Pooled regression time-series with robust errors computed on double cluster (TCR and year). Dependent 
variable LLPTAit: total loan loss provisions deflated by firm’s total assets. Independent variables: ILTAit: 
impaired loans to total assets; LTAit: loans to total assets; PBit: profit before tax and loan loss provision 
deflated by total assets; TCRit: total capital ratio; SIZEit: natural logarithm of total assets; GDPGt: GDP 
growth;  0it it itD PB PB  : interaction between a dummy variable (1: PBit is greater than zero; 0: 
otherwise) and PBit;  it highit itD PB PB  : interaction between a dummy variable (1: PBit is greater than 
the higher threshold, which is endogenously estimated with a value of 3.64%; 0: otherwise) and PBit; 
 it lowit itD PB PB  : interaction between a dummy variable (1: PBit is lower than the lower threshold, 
which is endogenously estimated with a value of 1.81%; 0: otherwise) and PBit. The remaining 
interactions between the corresponding dummy variable and PBit can be easily interpreted, given the 
former definitions. Robust p-values in brackets. PB values in bold are significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
 
 
